Measuring performance at the supply chain level: the role of the chain director by De Haan, Job A.C. & Sacristán-Díaz, Macarena
Working Papers on Operations Management. 
2016, Vol. 7, Nº1 (1-21) 
ISSN: 1989-9068 
  
 http://dx.doi.org/10.4995/wpom.v7i1.5380 
 
 
  1 
WPOM 
Measuring performance at the supply chain level: 
the role of the chain director 
Job A.C. de Haana y Macarena Sacristán-Díazb 
aTIAS Business School, Universiteit van Tilburg, Tilburg, Netherlands, J.A.C.deHaan@uvt.nl, b Financial Economics 
and Operactions Management Department, University of Seville, Seville, Spain, macarena-sd@us.es 
Recibido: 2016-04-21   Aceptado: 2016-05-02 
Abstract 
Supply chains lack their own across-the-board managers that can design and implement a 
performance measurement system (PMS), nor do they have an explicit overall strategy from 
which the PMS can be derived. The focus of this article is to develop a qualitative theoreti-
cal model on PM in supply chains to explore how to adopt PMS as a tool to implement col-
laboration and integration in chains. The exploratory nature of the research question de-
termined our use of a multiple case study. Two focal firms in the agro-food sector from 
Spain and the Netherlands, serving a total of five different chains, illustrate the message of 
the model. 
The findings show when an attempt to implement a PMS at the supply chain level might be 
appropriate and effective (if a chain exists and has a director), and how the system’s con-
tent should be focused on what is needed to improve chain performance (with end custom-
ers’ demands as a starting point). The paper highlights the benefits obtained by the other 
partners if they comply with the best informed supply chain member in the development of 
the chain’s PMS, as well as how a PMS cannot be developed when none of the partners can 
be labelled as chain director. 
 
Keywords: Supply Chain Management; External Integration; Performance Measurement; 
Chain Director; Agro-industry. 
 
Introduction 
Carter, Carter, Monczka, Slaight,& Swan (2000) included performance measurement as one of the top ten 
areas of research interest in SCM for the 1998-2008 period. Many of the articles on supply chain PMS 
concentrate on what measures and metrics to use (e.g., Beamon & Chen, 2001; Gunasekaran, Patel, & 
Tirtiroglu, 2001; Folan & Browne, 2005; Bhagwat & Sharma, 2007; Martin & Patterson, 2009; Arif-Uz-
Zaman & Nazmul Ahsan, 2014). Most of the above authors seem to suggest that similar measures and 
metrics can be applied at the chain level as at the company level. However, the difference at the aggrega-
tion level has some significant consequences, and measuring performance in the framework of the supply 
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chain remains difficult. Supply chains do not have a management hierarchy that can design and imple-
ment a PMS, nor do they have an explicit overall strategy from which the PMS can be derived. Conse-
quently, many questions relating to PMS, as a tool to implement collaboration and integration in supply 
chain implementation, evolution and maintenance remain (Aykuz & Erkan; 2010; Gopal & Thakkar, 
2012; Shepherd & Gunter, 2006), considering, in addition, that developing a PMS for the supply chain is 
a dependent process, tailored to specific supply chain requirements (Cuthbertson & Piotrowicz, 2011). 
Given the above observations, the focus of this article is on framework development and how to adopt 
PMS as a tool to implement collaboration and integration in chains. The framework should address two 
important differences between companies and chains: 1) a chain consists of a number of independent 
partners who cooperate with each other to a greater or lesser extent; 2) these independent partners can 
participate in different chains even if these chains are in competition with one another. Consequently, it 
may be difficult to identify the party-in-charge. Hence, important issues are: what customer demands will 
need to be converted into measures and who in a chain is in a position to do this and to implement these 
measures throughout the chain? Can the lack of hierarchy be overcome and if so, who can replace it? 
To sum up, the core research question for this article is: which partner in a supply chain can, effectively, 
take the initiative to implement SCI through the use of a PMS, i.e., which partner in a supply chain can 
decide which measures and metrics to use and how can it implement them? This question consists of three 
sub-questions: (1) When do we have a chain? (2) Which party can decide? and (3) What measures can be 
used? Our research is in two industries in the agro-food sector in two different countries to allow for an 
in-depth study and create the richest material possible. 
The remainder of the article is organised in four sections. Firstly, we build a conceptual model of a supply 
chain in which power differences between partners are supposedly natural and where partners’ benign 
self-interest contributes to the performance of the chain as a whole. Concepts from the Global Commodi-
ty Chain (Gereffi, 1999) and SCM will be integrated into this model. Secondly, the methodology used for 
the empirical study of two cases, one in Spain and the other in the Netherlands, is described. In the fol-
lowing section we present the results of the Dutch case study of fresh poultry and the Spanish study of 
canned olives. Hence we create maximal richness: different countries, different products and different 
technologies. We research and present the cases in three steps: (1) What chains? (2) Who can take the 
initiative? and (3) What measures? In the final section we discuss the findings against the background of 
our conceptual model and draw conclusions. 
Supply chain integration by means of performance measurement: a model  
Chains and supply chains 
De Haan, De Groot, Loo, & Ypenburg (2003) make a distinction between flows of goods and supply 
chains. Different types of relationships exist between partners in a flow or a chain, ranging from transac-
tional to vertically integrated (Whipple & Russell, 2007). As supply chains require close cooperation 
between partners, not all chains are supply chains. Companies simply cannot afford either time- or mon-
ey-wise to invest in close relationships with all their customers and suppliers. Fabbe-Costes & Jahre 
(2008) distinguish four intertwined layers of integration in SCI, from integration of (physical, information 
and financial) flows, through integration of processes and of technologies and systems, to integration of 
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(structure and organisations of) actors. The higher the layer of integration, the larger the investments in 
time and money needed, and the closer the cooperation between the partners will be. 
Very few, if any, firms manage their supply chain from suppliers’ supplier to customers’ customer 
(Bagchi, Ha, Skjoet-Larsen, & Soeresen, 2005). Following Kraljic’s (1983) classic distinction between 
kinds of goods according to related risk and contribution to profit, such close relationships are not always 
needed. Routine items with low risk and low contribution to profit are traded on the spot market where no 
close relations are required. However, high risk (of e.g., availability) strategic items with high contribu-
tion to profit do require close relationships and SCM. This implies a contingency approach to chains in 
general, and to SCI in particular. 
For most manufacturers the supply chain is not a simple pipeline but much more an uprooted tree, where 
branches and roots represent tiers of customers and suppliers, respectively (Lambert & Cooper, 2000). In 
these cases the manufacturer is the focal company, but a processor or another partner could also be con-
sidered as the focal company. This is irrespective of their importance, but simply depends on where the 
analysis of the chain starts from. A chain of this type is simply a particular route through the network, 
starting with primary producers and ending at the end customer who has to be satisfied. In our approach 
we take extended supply chains as the scope of our analysis (Bagchi et al., 2005; Fabbe-Costes & Jahre 
2008), rather than partial chains as distinguished by Bagchi et al. (2005), i.e., the direct supply chain or 
the dyads and triads mentioned by Fabbe-Costes & Jahre (2008). 
Ultimately, the purpose of cooperation is to satisfy end customers’ demands, i.e., customer satisfaction as 
a shared objective of the whole supply chain (Zokaei & Hines, 2007). Consequently, it will be a distinct 
advantage if a supply chain effectively captures genuine consumer attributes and analyses the value prop-
osition at each step. Zokaei & Hines (2007) distinguish ‘must-be attributes’ and ‘attractive value attrib-
utes’, the former are hygiene factors, like order satisfiers, whereas the latter delight consumers and result 
in more than proportional satisfaction, like order winners. Hence, to be effective as a supply chain and 
obtain greater revenue than the firms operating individually, partners should integrate to the layer that 
enables them to achieve the cooperation that they need. 
 
Who can take the initiative?  
When the focal company is just another link in the chain, no different from any of the other links, there is 
no compelling reason for it to be the key partner in the chain. The role that each of the companies in-
volved plays decides which is best-suited to assuming the ‘management’ role. As the ultimate goal of a 
supply chain is to satisfy the end customer, being aware of customer demands is one crucial aspect of a 
chain (Morgan, 2007). Another crucial task is to coordinate all the chain partners’ behaviour towards 
satisfying end customers (Fabbe-Costes & Jahre, 2008). The question is: which partner can assume re-
sponsibility for this and, preferably, fulfil both of these aims at one and the same time? 
Gereffi (1999) distinguishes between two types of international economic networks or chains: producer-
driven and buyer-driven. In producer-driven chains, a manufacturer designs branded products and pro-
duces them with its own technology, suppliers provide the manufacturer with parts designed by the manu-
facturer, and customers distribute the product to the end customers in conformance with the producer’s 
marketing strategy. Whether the product is a success or a failure depends on how well the manufacturer 
can ‘read’ the market. In a buyer-driven chain, the retailer decides what products are needed, when they 
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are needed and what they should look like. Suppliers produce these products in conformance with the 
specifications set. Whether the chain is a success or a failure depends on how well the retailer can ‘read’ 
or create the market. In both types of chains we see a key partner who is aware of the demands of the end 
customer. 
Why would the other partners in the chain follow this key partner if they are independent companies and 
not subsidiaries? However, this is a prerequisite for overcoming the issue of different partners having 
different opinions on consumer demands that may cause conflicting behaviour and poor consumer satis-
faction (Zokaei & Hines, 2007). Benign self-interest (De Haan et al., 2003) is a good explanation: if they 
follow, they join a successful team and enjoy the benefits. Immediate self-interest would cause adversari-
al relationships with chain partners vying with each other for a larger share of the pie, but benign self-
interest results in a win-win relationship, with chain partners cooperating to create a larger pie. Conse-
quently, partners view cooperation as a positive-sum game rather than a zero-sum game (Cao & Zhang, 
2011). Hence, a benevolent partner will subordinate immediate self-interest to the long-term benefit of all 
partners (Batt & Purchase, 2004). 
However, all parties have to be aware of this and of how they can take advantage of said benefits. Firstly, 
the dominant partner has to develop a strategy and address its immediate suppliers and customers to nego-
tiate contracts in line with end customers’ demands. For the other parties to be able to comply with what 
is demanded of them, their own suppliers and customers must also be aware of these demands and also 
fulfil them on the basis of negotiated contracts. In such a case the suppliers do not take great care to pro-
duce to direct customers’ specifications as they often do not reflect consumer requirements (Zokaei & 
Hines, 2007). Secondly, it should be transparent that all partners benefit in a similar way from this 
knowledge: neither should the key partner take too much from the added value, nor should the other part-
ners act as free riders and underperform. Each partner is able to do an analysis to see what its ‘win’ share 
is in the win-win relationship. 
Another problem that arises is that companies can be partners in different chains and have to meet the 
demands of different categories of end customer. They therefore have to organise their processes in dif-
ferent ways to be able to do so. One-size-fits-all would imply that they over-perform for one chain but 
under-perform for others (Morgan, 2007). Over-performing would reduce the overall value added for the 
chain and hence would not be beneficial, as more would be produced than the customer has asked for and 
is willing to pay for. Under-performing might result in the chain not satisfying the end customer’s de-
mands and in it no longer being successful. In such a case, the under-performing partner might be exclud-
ed from the chain. So, since partners hold different positions and may be involved in different chains, 
they may have conflicting goals. 
These different positions and goals may affect their contribution and complicate the availability and shar-
ing of information (Zokaei & Hines, 2007). Collaborative planning depends on the level of trust and the 
quality of the information-shared between firms (Petersen, Ragatz, & Monczka, 2005). 
To sum up: the dominant partner or ‘chain director’ assumes responsibility for being aware of demands 
and coordinating partners’ behaviour. Hence the dominant partner’s role is analogous to that of manage-
ment in a company, despite the partners being independent and not part of a vertically integrated firm 
(Bagchi et al., 2005). However, the dominant partner must act in a way that goes beyond contracts and 
codes and includes the relational aspects of SCI. The dominant partner should adapt its behaviour to the 
supply chain’s level of aggregation and should create circumstances that enhance information-sharing and 
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develop the mutual trust that enables all partners to recognise the benefits of the win-win relationship. 
Consequently, in a supply chain formed of cooperating independent firms, the dominant party replaces 
management in a firm to a certain extent, and so can be labelled ‘chain director’. 
 
Content of a performance measurement system for SCI 
Performance can be measured at different levels where lower levels contribute to performance on higher 
levels, activities to processes, processes to companies and companies, finally, to chain performance 
(Morgan, 2007). For the supply chain, improvements in one partner’s performance, e.g., because of im-
mediate self-interest, may cause a drop in another partner’s performance or in the chain’s as a whole, e.g., 
because of re-work. Instead, the measures should facilitate the integration of functional areas and of the 
extended enterprises along the chains, i.e., reflect the collective interests of the parties involved (Medlin, 
2006; Morgan, 2007). 
To enhance the information flow within the chain, partners should have a number of measures in common 
and have sufficient mutual trust to share this information (Petersen et al., 2005; Handfield & Bechtel, 
2002). They may also apply additional measures, e.g., for other chains or for their individual overall strat-
egy. However, in practice these common measures do not always exist (Aramyan, Oude Lannsink, Van 
der Vorst, & Van Kooten, 2007). On the other hand, collaborative practices can be driven by supply chain 
models, such as Efficient Consumer Response to improve performance through information-sharing (Bai-
ley & Francis, 2008).  
In the above-mentioned literature, many measures and metrics are often proposed irrespective of product, 
industry or type of customer. But as SCM is about satisfying the end customer, chains, just like compa-
nies, have to meet their required standard of service level (Chan, 2003). Thus, different measures apply 
for different types of customers in different types of industries. It is currently widely recognised that met-
rics should principally reflect order winners and strategy: the crucial customer demands and how we try 
to meet them (Zokaei & Hines, 2007). Consequently, performance is a multidimensional concept and 
actions to improve one dimension may be indifferent or even counter-productive for other dimensions or 
overall performance (Murphy et al., 1996). Metrics should not be longer exclusively financial (Ghalayini 
& Noble, 1996) and global supply chains require new tools (Gunasekaran & Kobu, 2007). 
 
The model 
For chains to compete as supply chains, all cooperating partners should have a thorough and common 
understanding of what the end customer really wants. This understanding does not emerge by itself, but 
has to be developed and communicated. A chain director does know customers’ demands and how to 
create value for them. The dominant party can take the initiative to develop the metrics for such a system 
based on its knowledge of final customers’ expectations (Zokaei & Hines, 2007; Morgan, 2007). 
To align their understanding, chain partners have to meet three requirements: (1) they must align process-
es (Fabbe-Costes & Jahre, 2008); (2) to be able to do so, they have to know the order winners and qualifi-
ers (Zokaei & Hines, 2007); and (3) to be willing to do so, they have to know that the division of surplus 
value added is fair versus a more adversarial chain. The Model is illustrated graphically in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1. Theoretical model 
 
Process alignment is needed to prevent downstream additional repair processes to adapt output from up-
stream processes that did not create end customer value. These processes add costs to the product, but do 
not create value. If these processes can be avoided, the partners create the desired value, but at a lower 
cost. Hence the supply chain becomes more competitive because of the synergy between partners rather 
than when the individual partners acted as independent groups. 
Partners are able to align processes if they know what is expected. Shared market knowledge throughout 
the chain builds upon the knowledge of the chain director, who knows end consumer requirements and 
can turn them into order winners and qualifiers: what the acceptable price is for the requested quality, or 
what the acceptable quality is for the requested low price. The chain director can also turn these strategic 
requirements into operational performance criteria that the chain has to meet and to which each tier also 
has to contribute. Supply chain PMS can be developed in a focused way: only the criteria that matter for 
the end customer will be included. 
Partners may be willing to adapt their processes if they know that it is also in their benign self-interest. 
The cost of process adaptations should be compensated for and hence the contribution to the chain should 
be perceived as substantial; it should be difficult for others to provide the chain with this, i.e., the contri-
bution should be perceived as a strategic item. Whether these conditions are met can be shown by apply-
ing the supply chain PMS. The performance of all partners now becomes more transparent not only to 
their immediate partners, but also beyond them and throughout the chain as a whole. 
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Methodology  
The exploratory nature of our research question determined our use of a multiple case study. As we ask 
‘why’ and ‘how’ questions about performance measurement in chains in specific circumstances, little 
control exists over events, and the topic is current. In such circumstances a case study approach, which 
has also achieved great importance in the Operations Management area (Meredith, 1998; Voss, Tsikrik-
tsis, & Frohlich, 2002), is most appropriate (Yin, 1994; George & Bennett, 2005). 
The analysis of various levels of supply and demand is a fundamental requirement for establishing the 
rigor of research in SCM (Seuring, 2008). Performance measurement at the chain level makes field work 
more complicated than at the company level. Frohlich & Westbrook (2001) highlighted this complication 
previously. 
The case studies are (a) theory-led, in as much as the model developed in previous section governs the 
case description and (b) explorative, in so far as their goal is to find out whether the model helps the em-
pirical data on PM in supply chains to be understood. 
 
The cases 
As chains consist of independent companies, we chose focal companies instead of chains as our cases. 
These focal companies would give access to the other companies involved in the chain and would show 
whether parallel PMSs exist should the company participate in more than one chain. As a consequence, 
the two focal firms would give access to a larger number of chains. 
The researchers are from Spain and the Netherlands; hence cases were selected from these two countries. 
This would not only allow easier access because of the local presence, but also enhance the richness of 
the data. The two countries have different distribution systems: in the Netherlands there is the dominance 
of a few large retail chains, whereas in Spain SMEs are still of major importance in addition to retail 
chains. Two industries with considerable differences were selected in the agro-food sector: vegetable 
(olive) versus animal (poultry), canned/processed products versus fresh products, segment commodities 
versus branded products. Finally, the focal companies were expected to be participating in chains both 
with and without chain directors. The aim was for all these differences to contribute to the richness of the 
data, which would enhance the chance of building theory from these cases (Figure 2 illustrates both cases 
graphically). 
The Dutch focal organisation is a large processor of fresh poultry that serves two different retail chains (A 
and B), each serving different market segments. In poultry consumption, fillet of chicken breast is the 
dominant product and all other parts are by-products. The poultry market consists of different segments 
depending on the fillet as a percentage of the chicken’s weight, value added to the meat, and the prices 
involved. Most of the sales to customer A are fillet of chicken breast and other value-added products, with 
a rather broad range of almost 70 different products (required by the retailer). With customer B, the as-
sortment is only 30 products and most sales are of by-products. 
The Spanish focal firm is a small family-owned company that is one of the four top producers in the 
country (which cover 30% of national production). It is highly integrated, although the firm outsources its 
logistics services. It developed its own wide assortment of products by adding value (removing pits, slic-
ing, adding flavours and/or stuffing the olives) and using different types of packaging (sachets, cans and 
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jars) of different sizes. In total, the assortment covers some 70 items. Basically it caters to three types of 
customer: retail chains, local Spanish customers, and importers from other countries. 
 
Figure 2. Theoretical model 
 
Data collection and data analysis 
Two people collected the data in each case, one working for the company and the other for a university, 
thus enabling researcher triangulation (Denzin, 1989). The first had access to all the data in their compa-
nies relevant for this study because of their day-to-day participant observations. They could triangulate 
these with (informal) talks and interviews with their colleagues, as well as with company documents. 
This implies methods and source triangulation that further guarantee the reliability of the data in addition 
to researcher triangulation (Voss et al., 2002). The university researchers also visited the companies to 
observe the processes, interview executives and study documents. The two researchers discussed their 
reported experiences with interviews, documents and observations. The university researchers wrote 
preliminary reports on the companies and their chain(s) following the model that had been developed and 
ensured that all aspects were covered adequately. These reports were then sent to the corresponding com-
pany and the other university researcher for checking. Then the university researchers met to discuss the 
reports as well as the comments from the companies on their reports for these to be finalised. Finally, the 
university researchers determined the commonalities and differences between the cases and confronted 
these with the findings from the literature to identify the content of the variables from the model and the 
relationships between them. Input from the companies and the literature improved the level of internal 
validity in the case descriptions. 
 
Case A: Fresh Poultry in The Netherlands
Case B: Preserved Table Olives in Spain
Fresh poultry
producer
Wholesaler
(chain A’s)
Wholesaler
(chain B’s)
Retailers
(chain A’s)
Retailers
(chain B’s)
Pre-growing Growers
Table olives
producerRearers
Wholesaler
(chains’)
Wholesaler
(Firm’s)
Retail chains
Local customers
Wholesaler
(Importer abroad) Unknown
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Results 
Focal company chains 
The Dutch focal company serves two very different customers, A and B. Both customers pursue specific 
and explicit strategies to satisfy their customers. Customer A offers a broad assortment at a relatively high 
price resulting from the value added to the poultry. It tries to attract its customers even more by weekly 
promotions of one or two items from the assortment, which means that week-to-week fluctuations exceed 
day-to-day fluctuations. Because of the value-adding activities, the shelf life of the products is only 4 to 5 
days. Customer B offers a limited assortment, with only a minimum of added value, sold at a relatively 
low price. B applies an everyday low price strategy (EDLP). Consequently, day-to-day fluctuations ex-
ceed week-to-week fluctuations. Because of the relatively straightforward products, shelf life is up to 6 
days. 
The focal company serves customer A from two specialised plants. At the first the chickens are slaugh-
tered, whereas at the second, about a one-hour drive from the first, further processing is performed, either 
simply packing or value-adding activities. Value adding activities can include marinating, pre-cooking, 
etc. Plants one and two have modern equipment that is kept up-to-date in order to preserve the quality of 
the final products. Customer B is served from plant three, which concentrates on slaughtering but has 
some departments for value-adding activities as well. The equipment at this plant has been in use for a 
period of time and reflects a mature technology. The R&D department is active in breeding new pedigrees 
of poultry that are more appropriate for customer demands. Such demands consist of resistance to illness, 
and chicken composition and weight. 
Chicken farmers supply either plant one or plant three depending on their distance from the plants and the 
pedigree of their chickens. Some pedigrees are more suitable for value-adding than others and are sup-
plied to plant one, whereas others provide larger chickens that are supplied to plant three. Experts from 
the processor advise the farmers on timing and numbers when rearing a new batch. 
In most cases, farmers use feeding materials produced by a firm that belongs to the same conglomerate as 
the processor. Feeding materials differ for the various pedigrees to ensure the required composition and 
weight of the chickens to satisfy end customer requirements. 
The Spanish focal company serves both domestic and foreign end customers. The domestic customers are 
served through both large retail chains and small local shops. Local shops serve end customers in their 
immediate vicinity in lower market segments. The market share of these shops is declining. They are 
served with the help of regional distributors. The retail chains serve higher market segments and their 
overall market share in increasing. Table olives are a very important product in Spanish supermarkets 
compared to other countries and shelf space and the number of varieties on sale reflect this importance. 
The processor only sells branded products and has succeeded in avoiding private label production. The 
chains supply their shops from their regional distribution centres. Although exports are relatively new for 
the processor, they are growing rapidly. The importers abroad have sole rights in the destination countries 
and are responsible for sales and distribution in their respective markets. Consequently, the downstream 
chain is unknown to the processor.  
A network of regional distributors serves the local shops. The distributor is not the owner of the goods 
and only gets a fee for its services. 
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The processor receives the olives in the harvesting season: September-October. Upon arrival, the olives 
are cleaned and stored to size. Next, the olives are pre-processed and stored for production at a later date. 
The various items of the assortment are produced throughout the year and packed according to a produc-
tion plan, based in essence on the previous year’s sales. As might be expected, changing market shares 
complicate planning, for exports in particular, as products require labelling adapted to national require-
ments, but production runs need to be relatively long because of long set up times. On average, about 
three months’ sales are kept in stock. Products are packed in sachets (cheapest assortment, domestic mar-
ket), large (large consumers) and small (small consumers) cans and jars and special products. Jars are best 
suited to export, but not for stuffed products. The processor is responsible for transport to the chains’ 
regional distribution centres. 
A group of four or five growers supply the processor and have been doing so for many years. Supplies are 
checked in the field before transportation to the factory. Growers are experienced and know how to ex-
ploit their trees sustainably. 
 
Roles of the partners in the chains 
In the Dutch case (summarised in Table 1), customers A and B respectively target different market seg-
ments and hence require poultry with different characteristics and processes to satisfy their customers. 
Customer A focuses on selling a broad assortment and outsources poultry inventory management to the 
processor. Customer A plans its promotions and communicates them to the processor in time to facilitate 
timely growing and processing of chickens. Customer B requires daily delivery in conformance with 
expected sales. As its end customers want generous portions, chickens for customer B have to be relative-
ly large in size. 
The processor manages the inventory of poultry at customer A distribution centre level by means of ven-
dor managed inventory (VMI). Two requirements have to be met: one on minimum and the other on max-
imum inventory. The modern equipment in plants one and two reduces processing time and enhances the 
freshness of the product upon delivery. The traditional equipment of plant three allows for low fixed costs 
and consequently low overall costs. Experts from the processor advise the farmers not only about batch 
planning but also about feeding and all kinds of hygiene-related aspects. 
Farmers near plant one specialise in pedigree chickens with a relatively high amount of fillet meat. As 
these chickens are relatively small they cannot be used for customer B. Farmers near plant three specialise 
in pedigree chickens that produce more overall weight. These cannot be processed in plant one. Supplying 
nearby plants minimises travel time and costs. Farmers breed and feed in line with end customer demands 
as communicated by retailers. 
 
 Dutch chain A Dutch chain B 
End customer Assortment Product, price 
Retailer Own shop, promotions Own shop, EDLP 
Wholesaler VMI in own RDC Own RDC 
Producer Value adding Just processing 
Grower Proximity, legal requirements Proximity, legal requirements, audits 3rd party 
Pre-growing Producer controls Producer controls 
Table 1. Summary of the Dutch Case 
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In the Spanish case  (summarized in Table 2) all customers will get the branded products from the as-
sortment that they order, although the labels for exported products will be adapted to national require-
ments in the country of destination. 
The retail chains decide which part of the processor’s assortment they will sell and whether they will also 
sell table olives from other processors. Whether, how and when the retail chains will use promotions is 
also negotiated when quantities and prices for the following year are determined. This indicates the pro-
cessor’s quality level. The shops order directly from the distributor. However, the distributor is not re-
sponsible for stock outs or running out of ‘best-before’ dates; the processor is. 
The processor develops its assortment independently of the other parties in the chain and negotiates with 
retail chains on which part thereof they will buy and against what conditions. Local shops simply have to 
accept the conditions for the items that they order through the regional distributor. Recently the processor 
changed premises and invested in modern equipment and now meets requirements such as HACCP. The 
processor participates in collective promotion campaigns to develop markets in countries where table 
olive consumption is still low. 
The growers are fully aware of the high quality standards because of their long-term relationships and 
advice from the processor. Consequently, no additional or detailed requirements need to be negotiated. 
Prices simply reflect levels of supply and demand in the market. The larger the olives are, the more attrac-
tive they are and hence the higher the price.  
 Retail chains Local customers Exports 
End customer Assortment  Proximity, assortment ?? 
Retailer  Own shop, season Local shop, season ?? 
Wholesaler Own RDC Firms’ RDC Importers  
Producer  Pack, (pre-) produce Pack, (pre-) produce Pack by country 
Grower Producer advises Producer advises Producer advises 
Table 2. Summary of the Spanish Case 
 
Measures used in the chains 
In the Dutch case the processor serves two very different customers and adapts its strategy and operations 
to them. Hence the measures used will have to be different to allow for effective SCM. Customer A’s 
customers demand a wide assortment and accept a relatively high price, whereas B’s customers focus on 
an everyday low price as well as large quantity/products. The demands for the intangible service part of 
the deal also differ: A’s customer demands are less specific than those of B’s customers. Table 3 summa-
rises how A and B analyse the decisive end customer demands respectively, i.e., order winners converted 
to specific criteria. 
Criterion Chain A Chain B 
Product  Wide assortment (70 items), limited quantity/product, 
value added, fresh product, recognizable product 
Fresh product, relatively large quantity/product 
Service  Tracking & tracing based on codes Traditional and healthy product 
Price Relatively high, but fluctuates because of promotions Relatively low, but fixed everyday low price 
Table 3. Translation of order winners by chain director 
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The next step is to identify strategic differences between the two chains in terms of these criteria, order 
winners and order qualifiers. Table 4 summarises these differences. 
 Order winner Order qualifier 
Time/availability  A, B 
Cost/price  B A 
Quality  A (assortment), 
B (audit) 
A (safety, regulations), 
B (assortment) 
Table 4. Strategic differences between chains in the Dutch case 
 
Finally, the metrics used in the two Dutch chains to ensure that the end customers get what they want are 
determined on the basis of order winners and order qualifiers. Table 5 summarises these metrics for the 
two customers’ chains. 
Partner Chain A Chain B 
Retail 
process 
Time: shelf time 4-5 days, 99% of shop orders 
fulfilled, several fixed delivery times/day 
Quality: packaging specifications, proper coding 
of products, full assortment 
Time: Black box 
Quality: Black box 
Wholesale 
process 
Time: delivery within 18 hours, 2/day, VMI 
buffer stock allowed 17-35%, 
Quality: full assortment, food safety in line with 
codes (BRC, IKB, HACCP), product composition 
specifications, some diseases are not allowed 
Time: shelf time 6-7 days Delivery within 24 h., 
Quality: 100% fulfilled (might be in 2 batches, 
tracking & traceability based audits beyond 
codes, some pesticides not allowed 
Processor  Time: lead time 18 hours 
Quality: 100% orders met 
Time: lead time 18 hours 
Quality: 100% orders met 
Grower  Time: period to get proper weight 
Quality: maximum weight, growth data  
Time: period to get proper weight 
Quality: minimum weight, growth data, feed 
should not contain some pesticides and be vege-
table (50%) 
Pre-
growing 
Time: period of producing eggs/hen 
Quality: live up hens up to product demands 
Time: period of producing eggs/hen 
Quality: live up hens up to retailer product de-
mands 
Table 5. Metrics used by partners in the Dutch case 
 
The situation is quite different in the Spanish case as the relationships between the partners are much 
looser. The downstream part of the export chain is a black box for the processor; hence order winners or 
order qualifiers cannot be determined. The local shops can buy the processors’ products against fixed 
conditions or decide to buy products from another, perhaps even unbranded, processor. The large retail 
chains negotiate a new contract on quantities, prices and other conditions every year. Based on previous 
experience, the processor pursues a strategy for two chains: local shops and retails chains. Table 6 sum-
marises these strategies. 
 Order winner Order qualifier 
Time/availability LC RC, LC 
Cost/price   RC, LC 
Quality  RC (assortment), 
LC (assortment) 
RC (safety, regulations), LC (safe-
ty, regulations) 
Table 6. Different strategies of partners in the Spanish case 
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Because of the importance of table olives in Spain, neither retail chains nor local shops can afford to be 
out of stock. Hence availability is crucial and this, together with market power, determines the metrics 
used in these chains. Table 7 summarises the metrics. 
 
Partner Retail chains segment Local customers segment 
Focal company Time: Lead times depend on stock and 
season. Economic penalty if delay. 
Quality: 100% orders met 
Time: Lead times depend on stock and 
season. No economic penalty if delay. 
Quality: 100% orders met 
Table 7. Metrics used by partners in the Spanish case 
Discussion  
Supply chains 
The scope of the description is for both the Dutch and the Spanish cases and full chains, even though the 
chains seem to be rather short (Fabbe-Costes & Jahre, 2008). The Dutch case starts with producing the 
right eggs ultimately to meet end customers’ demands. The Spanish case starts not with the growing of 
the olive trees, as they are in use for decades, but with the growing of the olives, and finishes at the end 
consumer. Together the two focal companies serve five chains. The Dutch focal company serves two 
chains in which very close relationships exist to ensure that the crucial demands of the end customers are 
met. For all partners in these chains down to the producer, the product i.e., poultry, is, in Kraljic’s terms, a 
strategic item. This product is what they concentrate on and hence contributes considerably to their sales 
and profits. If they do not deliver conformance to what the next partner needs to satisfy its next partner, 
essentially no alternative exists to remedy this. Hence product-associated risk is high. The risks are also 
high for retail chains A and B, as no alternative suppliers exist to replace the current processor at short 
notice. Although the direct contribution of poultry to sales and profit may be limited, these products fit in 
perfectly with what their customers expect. If the product is no longer available, there could be conse-
quences for customer loyalty. Consequently, the retail chains may also consider poultry as a strategic 
item. Hence in these cases supply chains exist in which the customers’ voices are heard even by the farm-
ers who breed and feed to meet end customer demands. Everything in both chains can be characterised as 
seamless and reveals win-win relationships for the partners (Childerhouse & Towill, 2003). However, 
chain A has to be more responsive because of the broad assortment that the end customers require, 
whereas chain B is more efficient, as the final customers require low prices (Fisher, 1997). The level of 
integration in these chains is high, as the flows (e.g., the number of chickens communicated to the grower 
in chain A, and the promotions given to the processor), the processes (VMI in A and feeding advice in B) 
and the systems (e.g., regarding quality) are aligned. As both scope and level of integration are high, the 
overall degree of integration is high both for chain A and B. 
The Spanish case serves three chains in all. The export chain is not a supply chain as the end customer is 
simply unknown or invisible to upstream parties in the chain. Although table olives, as such, may be 
strategic items for retail chains, any particular brand is not. The chains can sell different brands alongside 
each other and need not sell the full assortment of one particular brand, either. Hence the risk of availabil-
ity is low and this is not a strategic item for retail chains, as other suppliers can replace our focal compa-
ny, the processor. Consequently, a specific brand of table olives is much more a leverage product in 
Kraljic’s terms. Despite the long-term relationship with the growers, both parties act as if they are in a 
spot market. Hence despite the crucial contribution to sales and profit, this is not a strategic item because 
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of the lack of availability risk. This flow of goods (De Haan et al., 2003) is much more representative of a 
traditional manufacturing-driven, adversarial chain (Childerhouse & Towill, 2003). To make the flow of 
goods as attractive as possible for all parties involved, it should efficient (Fisher, 1997). Although the 
scope of integration is high (full chain), the degree of integration is low, as the level of integration is very 
low, with only physical and financial flows aligned and little information shared. 
 
Who can take the initiative? 
In the Dutch chains the two retailers are in charge as they choose which market segment to serve and are 
fully aware of their end customers’ demands. In addition, they are in a position to make their partners 
understand that it is in their benign self-interest to support the retailers’ strategies. Finally, they manage to 
make information available for all the parties to know that they all comply with the norms and that no-
body benefits more from their cooperation than agreed upon from the beginning. Consequently, they can 
be labelled as chain directors, who read the market and determine the route through the ‘uprooted tree’ to 
serve their market segments (Lambert & Cooper, 2000; Morgan, 2007; Fabbe-Costes & Jahre, 2008). 
However, the two retailers use different mechanisms to be effective chain directors. 
Very few, if any, firms manage their supply chain from suppliers’ supplier to customers’ customer 
(Bagchi et al., 2005). Hence A contracts the focal organisation as a processor and shares information on 
future promotion activities and through VMI. Hence A is vulnerable as the processor could take ad-
vantage, but the latter does not because of the attractive business he gets from this contract. The processor 
has even greater control over the supply chain by means of his contracts with his suppliers, since these 
contracts also reflect the processor’s customers’ demands. He also contacts his suppliers and immediate 
suppliers on the kind of poultry as well as the timing of production. Finally, he advises on feeding materi-
als, often produced by a sister company. Hence the end customer demands are known and transmitted 
throughout the chain. This allows for amplification to be dampened (Bailey & Francis, 2008) and pro-
vides incentives for collaboration and adequate mutual trust for information-sharing (Handfield & 
Bechtel, 2002; Dapiran & Hogarh-Scott, 2003; Cox, 2004). B also contracts the processor but with very 
different conditions which reflect his everyday low pricing strategy. Here an outside auditor gauges 
whether the partners in the chain meet demands (Ciliberti, De Haan, De Groot, & Pontrandolfo, 2011). 
The inventory at the retailer is a black box for the processor. Consequently, these supply chains are buyer-
dominated (Gereffi, 1999), as the retailer turns end customer demands from the chosen market segment 
into production demands for partners upstream in the chain.  
The Spanish focal company has its own brand of preserved olives and determines its own assortment. 
Contact with the customers is by means of contracts, which differ according to the power level that they 
have or are on in their chain. Local shop owners can only accept or reject, whereas the large retail chains 
can trial before adding to the contract. The customers decide which part of the processor’s assortment 
they buy. Although contact with the olive growers has existed for a long time, prices are negotiated every 
year based on market conditions. Beyond this, communication may be social but will not refer to agricul-
tural or commercial issues to any great extent. The low levels of mutual trust, openness and information-
sharing may cause amplification across the flows (Dapiran & Hogarth-Scott, 2003; Cox, 2004). Apparent-
ly, the processor acts completely freely of customer demands, even those of the large retailers. This is 
unlike the Dutch processor, which does not have an assortment of its own but simply produces what the 
customer wants. Consequently, the Spanish chain is not producer-driven, as might have been expected 
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because of the processor’s branded assortment (Gereffi, 1999). The large retailers are not in a position to 
impose their demands on the processor, as it can refuse to produce under a private label for these large 
customers. In short, the end customer demands are unknown to the processor, but not to the large retailers 
who choose a market segment to serve. Coordination in the Spanish chains occurs solely by means of 
prices based on supply and demand. None of the partners is in a position to decide on the strategy that the 
chain should follow to eventually enable all of them to be better off. Consequently, no information is 
shared (Handfield & Bechtel, 2002), and no amplification dampened (Bailey & Francis, 2008).  
 
Content of a performance measurement system 
The starting point should be customer demands, i.e., for individual companies, but for supply chains it 
should be the end customers’ demands, as formulated by the chain director (Zokaei & Hines, 2007; Mor-
gan, 2007). Consequently, PMSs may be very complicated as companies can act in different chains, serv-
ing different end customer segments. The Dutch focal company is an example of this as it serves both 
retailer A (differentiated assortment and relatively high prices) and B (everyday low prices). Hence this 
company should be able to show both of these chains that it meets the chains’ demands. In addition, it 
may use another PMS for internal use to see whether its own departments, processes etc. meet the de-
mands of the company and/or its investors. However, individual companies may also need different PMSs 
as they may serve different market segments. The Spanish focal company is an example in point as the 
large retail chains are able to negotiate their contracts, but local shop owners have no choice but to accept 
the contracts that the focal company presents them with. However, not only may the metrics be different 
for various segments and/or chains, but also the actual performance level required (Chan, 2003).  
For the supply chain, the improvement measures should facilitate integration between functional areas 
and the extended enterprises along the chains, i.e., reflect the collective interests of the parties involved 
(Medlin, 2006; Morgan, 2007). Consequently, the process organisation needed to produce output may 
also be different. Again, the Dutch focal company is an example-in-point as it has specialised plants to 
process poultry for each of the chains it serves, as well as different inventory systems. In fact, poultry 
from one chain cannot be used in the other, whereas such flexibility could occur in the Spanish focal 
company. 
The information flows to and from the two focal organisations differs considerably, as might be expected. 
The Spanish case reflects a flow of goods (De Haan et al., 2003); consequently, information flow between 
the participants is limited to the bare minimum. Because of the adversarial relationships, open infor-
mation exchange would make the party involved vulnerable. However, the Dutch case reflects a supply 
chain (De Haan et al., 2003); consequently, information flows between participants should facilitate a 
seamless flow of goods. This is what can be seen in, e.g., chain A: the retailer informs the processor about 
promotions, the processor notifies the poultry breeders about the timing and numbers of a new batch and 
its sister company informs the breeders about the feeding of the chickens. Consequently, the retailer di-
rects the quantity as well as the quality of the produce in the chain. 
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Conclusions  
This paper has examined who in a supply chain can, effectively, take the initiative to implement SCI by 
means of a PMS, i.e., decide what measures and metrics to use and how to implement them. Although 
SCM and related concepts, such as SCI, are not well-defined in the literature, both theorists and managers 
implicitly believe that greater integration in a chain yields greater efficiency. As the empirical results of 
research on this relationship are ambiguous, a contingency approach is suggested for this phenomenon. 
The first issue addressed is what the right conditions for SCI are. A distinction is made between flows of 
goods and supply chains, following Kraljics’ classic distinction between the nature of products according 
to related risk and contribution to profit. SCM is restricted to relationships between companies that deal 
with products regarded as strategic (high risk and high contribution). In the Dutch case we found that the 
focal company participated in two supply chains, as the product was strategic for all partners from the 
chicken farmer to the end customer. For everyone involved it made a large contribution to profit. There 
was also high availability risk, as partners are not interchangeable because of the different requirements 
of the customers in the various segments served. In the Spanish case, the focal company knows neither its 
end customers nor their requirements: its 70+ item assortment differs only in packaging for the various 
national and international segments. Partners can buy from, and sell to, other suppliers and customers 
with no major problems; hence availability risk is limited. In the Dutch case, supply chain collaboration 
and integration should be expected, whereas in the Spanish case this would be superfluous. Time and 
money invested in close relationships with suppliers and customers in the Dutch case would pay off, 
whereas in the Spanish case it could be a waste.  
However, supply chain collaboration and integration do not just happen, but rather have to be initiated by 
one of the partners in the chain. Hence, the next question is, which partner is in a position to initiate col-
laboration and integration effectively? This is a relevant question only if a supply chain exists. Thus, in 
the Spanish case, if it exists, supply chain collaboration and integration will not contribute to greater effi-
ciency in the chain; however, in the Dutch case, with two supply chains, it is a relevant question. As the 
two retailers dominate one supply chain each, the Dutch chains can be characterised as buyer-dominated. 
Hence the retailers can initiate supply chain collaboration and integration. Whether they can do so effec-
tively depends upon their ability to read the market, i.e., understand end customer demands, turn these 
demands into measures and metrics and communicate them, and persuade the other partners in the supply 
chain to adhere to these measures and metrics. In the Dutch case, each of the retailers has defined the 
market segment that it wants to serve and understands which measures reflect customer demands. Wheth-
er they can persuade the other partners in their chains depends on how attractive the offers that they can 
make them are. They should be able to show that accepting their offer is advantageous for all parties 
because the result will not be a zero-sum game, but rather a positive-sum game, and, in addition the divi-
sion of the positive-sum among all the partners in the chains is fair. Partners may accept a smaller part of 
the overall profit if the amount is more than the original amount of revenue earned, especially if less ef-
fort has to be put into participation. The latter can occur if, e.g., coordination and collaboration reduce 
rework to adapt work-in-process to end-customer demands. Consequently, partners’ benign self-interest 
may help to support persuasion by the retailer (as the dominant partner). In the Dutch case, the farmers 
know how many chickens are needed by the processor and when to facilitate the latter providing the re-
tailer with an adequate number of end products. This can be the chicken ‘as is’ in chain B, but in the case 
of chain A, it is all kinds of specialties. A similar situation exists with respect to quality, as the proces-
sor’s sister companies seek to optimise the pedigrees for each chain, as well as give advice on how to feed 
the chickens in order to achieve the optimal result to meet end-customer demands. Hence, both retail 
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chains A and B can be characterised as chain directors. In the Spanish case, neither the processor, nor the 
retailer is in a position to persuade the other partners. Despite the respected brand name of the processor, 
end customers are also able to buy products processed by other companies with respected brand names. 
Despite the large quantities that large retail chains may buy from the processor, the latter perseveres with 
its own assortment rather than adapting recipes to retailers’ demands. 
Once the chain director has chosen and defined the measures that reflect customer demands, it can con-
vert these into the metrics to be met. The order winners for end customers determine which measures will 
be used in the supply chain, both ex ante (knowing what should be done) and ex post (knowing whether 
the output conforms to demands). The chain directors can include the defined metrics in the contracts that 
they negotiate with the focal company, i.e., the processor. The latter will have to do the same when nego-
tiating with its suppliers to be sure that it will meet its customers’ demands, i.e., satisfy the retailer. Even 
though no formal PMS exists, all the parties thus know what is expected and what the recompense for this 
will be, as well as what their share of the price paid by the end customer is. 
To conclude, the major conditions for effective supply chain collaboration and integration are: 
 Firms must form a supply chain, i.e., they trade strategic items with each other; 
 One partner can act as a chain director and read the market, define end-customer demands, turn 
these into specific measures, and persuade the other partners in the chain, who accept because of 
benign self-interest; and 
 The resulting measures and metrics derived reflect the order-winning end-customer demands. 
If companies participate in more than one supply chain, they may have to use different sets of measures 
and metrics. In such cases they may split their processes to serve each of the chains, in the same way that 
the processor in the Dutch case does. The processor in the Spanish case does not need to make this split, 
as all its customers receive the same product, albeit in different packaging for export. 
In order to be aware whether supply chain collaboration and integration can contribute to a more efficient 
supply chain, managers need to know whether they are participating in a supply chain, and whether their 
company is its chain director. If both answers are no, supply chain collaboration and integration will not 
create customer value but are additional costs that diminish a company’s profit. If the first answer is yes, 
but the second no, the company knows that it cannot initiate effective supply chain collaboration and 
integration, but that, because of benign self-interest, it may respond positively to initiatives from some 
other potential chain director. 
Although these results answer a number of questions raised in the literature to a certain degree, further 
research could provide more ‘thick evidence’. Most supportive evidence is from one buyer-driven supply 
chain from the fresh product agri-business in the Netherlands, whereas the Spanish case shows that if the 
conditions are not met, collaboration and integration do not result in more efficient supply chains. More 
cases from other countries, applying other technologies, dealing with other kinds of products and with 
other dominant parties, and so on and so forth, could strengthen, nuance or reject the preliminary findings 
of the analysis presented here. 
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